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A Ritual Approach to Deterrence: I Am, Therefore I Deter 
Maria Mälksoo 
University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies 
 
How can ritual help to understand the practice of deterrence? Traditional deterrence scholarship 
tends to overlook the active role of deterring actors in creating and redefining the circumstances 
to which they are allegedly only reacting. In order to address the weight of deterrence as a 
symbol, collective representation and strategic repertoire, this article proposes to rethink 
deterrence as a performative strategic practice with ritual features and critical binding, 
releasing and restraining functions. I posit a ritual account of deterrence to better grasp the 
performance, credibility and the presumed effect of this central international security practice. 
An understanding of deterrence as a ritual-like social practice probes the scope of rational 
deterrence theory, replacing its ‘I think, therefore I deter’-presumption with a socially and 
politically productive ‘I am, therefore I deter’-logic. Drawing on the example of NATO’s 
Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), the proposed conceptualization of extended deterrence as 
an interaction ritual chain in allied defence, solidarity and community-building offers novel 
insights about the deterrence and collective identity nexus. Extended deterrence has much more 
than deterrence at stake: how an alliance practices deterrence tells us more about the alliance 
itself than about the nature of threats it responds to. The tripwire posture of the eFP highlights 
the instrumentality of ritualization for mediating ambiguity in extended deterrence. 
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NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland is 
frequently praised as the biggest reinforcement of Alliance collective defence in a generation. 
The unprecedented forward deployment of multinational allied forces on NATO’s eastern 
flank is ‘a visible demonstration of the Alliance’s commitment to Article V of the Washington 
Treaty, which enshrines the principle that an attack against one ally is an attack against all’ 
(‘SACEUR visits’, 2018). The former commander of eFP Battlegroup Lithuania, Lieutenant 
Colonel René Braun has compared the Alliance’s posture in the region to the French, British 
and American commitments to West Berlin from 1945 to 1989: ‘In these 44 years NATO-
forces might have been inferior and not ready to face an attack of conventional forces, but 
through disciplined conduct, credible will to defend and unbroken passion for the fight for 
freedom they were also responsible that West Berlin was never attacked by regular forces’ 
(‘NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup Lithuania’, 2018). Yet, the Alliance’s 
deterrent in the framework of eFP is notably more symbolic than the Berlin analogy of the Cold 
War suggests: NATO has opted but for a rotational tripwire force rather than a capability for a 
more robust territorial defence in case of an attack, regardless of Russia’s time and space 
advantage, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and consequent challenges for NATO 
to provide rapid reinforcements in the region.  
 
NATO’s walking the tightrope between reassuring the exposed allies on the eastern flank and 
discouraging a putative challenger by the costly signal of forward (if numerically light) 
deployment of forces illustrates a core concern of extended deterrence – signalling credibility 
while mediating ambiguity vis-à-vis different audiences. Whereas the scholarly debate on the 
benefits and disadvantages of ambiguity about commitments and prospective responses to an 
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attack is ongoing (e.g., Morgan, 2003; Crawford, 2003; Benson, 2012), it is generally agreed 
that the credibility issue (and the related dosing of ambiguity) is trickier for alliances compared 
to individual states. While rational deterrence theory by and large treats credibility as if it is 
objective and measurable, the symbolism attached to the presence of the American forces by 
the protégé states in eFP’s extended deterrence relationship (think ‘Fort Trump’ in Poland) 
evocatively underscores how the very content of deterrence is ‘neither self-evident nor 
automatic’ for considerable socio-political effort is involved in making deterrence policies, 
strategies, and practices ‘count as deterrents in a political sense’ (Vuori, 2016: 29).  
 
I argue that this work is done by the ritualization of deterrence – the strategic use of ritual 
features and symbolic action central to deterrence as a social practice. Building on the calls to 
go beyond rational choice to other theories of international behaviour in order to better 
understand how deterrence works (Jervis, 1979; Benford and Kurtz, 1987; Lebow and Stein, 
1989; Vuori, 2016; Lupovici, 2010, 2016, 2019), I develop a theoretical account of deterrence 
based on the core concept of ritual, understood as a ‘rule-governed activity of symbolic 
character which draws the attention of its participants to objects of thought and feeling …they 
hold to be of special significance’ (Lukes, 1975: 291). I do this first and foremost by borrowing 
from Catherine Bell, an American scholar of religious studies and sociologist Randall Collins 
the insights about the political work of rituals and interaction ritual chains. To Émile Durkheim 
(2008) and Erving Goffman (1967), the two doyens of ritual scholarship, on whom Collins’ 
Interaction Ritual Theory builds, the term ritual denoted ‘a mechanism of mutually focused 
emotion and attention producing a momentarily shared reality, which thereby generates 
solidarity and symbols of group membership’ (Collins, 2004: 7). My contention is not that 
deterrence is a symbol or a rite. Rather, once we see the ritual features of deterrence – such as 
formalization, embodied performances, and sacral symbolism attached to particular forces and 
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weapon types, we can better understand how credible commitment in extended deterrence is 
accomplished. The performative power of deterrence depends on its capacity to produce the 
effect it names (i.e. credibility of threat/allied commitment) as per the standard logic of a 
homeopathic ritual (‘like producing like’) (cf. Ansorge, 2012: 147). The effective performance 
of extended deterrence is premised on sustaining a modicum of constructive ambiguity in the 
public displays of this security practice. The symbolic ambiguity of extended deterrence is 
maintained through ‘interaction ritual chains’ of allied defence, solidarity and community-
building (cf. Collins, 2004).  
 
My proposed supplement to the interpretive study of deterrence opens up new insights on 
mediating ambiguity as a contested – yet key – element in communicating commitment in 
extended deterrence. Taking the manifold ritual features of deterrence, and their ‘front-stage’ 
strategic performance1 seriously allows for a synthesized study of symbolic and strategic logics 
of action in the practice of deterrence. Emphatic ritualization as a flexible and strategic way of 
acting (Bell, 1997: 138) is a socially elaborate version of what traditional deterrence 
scholarship refers to as ‘costly signals’ to establish a credible commitment in case numerical 
advantage cannot be reclaimed (cf. ‘manipulation of risk’ and ‘the threat that leaves something 
to chance’; Schelling, 1966; 1960). Such ritual dramatization may seek to compensate for the 
lack of real consensus about the alleged threat within an alliance, or attempt to conceal the 
rather symbolic de facto commitment in military terms. The ritualization of deterrence serves 
 
1
 I focus on the publicly observable symbolic and ritual practices of deterrence as the most notable instances of 
this strategic stage performance (Goffman, 1959). Threats that are communicated in public are deemed costlier 
and therefore more credible signals of resolve than private communications (Crawford, 2003: 12). The ‘back-
stage’ interaction between political leaders and diplomats is distinctly ritualized in its own right, but less accessible 
to all relevant target audiences of deterrence signalling. 
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as a potent valve for communicating credibility of commitment and dramatizing the deterrent 
intent in an extended deterrence situation, along with answering the identity demands of a 
collective actor. Designed to simultaneously deter a challenger and reassure an ally, high-level 
statements bearing a politically deterrent message, large-scale military exercises, force posture 
shifts, training and simulation practices enable different audiences to receive different 
messages about the deterrer’s commitment and resolve. An element of meaning indeterminacy 
allowing for more than one interpretation of the set-up of deterrent could thus be politically 
useful for the collective actor.  
 
Methodologically, the paper’s principle of operation is explication: it combines the ‘how’-
question of understanding the constitutive role of ritual in deterrence as a social practice with 
a ‘why’-question of explaining the mediation of ambiguity in extended deterrence on the 
example of NATO’s opting for a small forward presence force in Poland and the Baltic states. 
eFP is a good case for illustrating credibility-making from a ritual perspective: the performance 
of carefully calibrated symbolic deterrence on the Alliance’s eastern flank after Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea helps to maintain NATO’s self-identity as a defensive alliance for its 
contemporary audiences. The ambiguity of the light tripwire set-up of the Alliance’s forward 
presence in the Baltic region is politically useful for NATO as it leaves room for the putative 
challenger and the protégé countries to receive different messages thereof. A ritual approach 
provides a sociologically thick lens for seizing the broader symbolic significance of NATO’s 
public re-attachment to its staple security practice post-2014 crisis in Ukraine, including the 
materialization of the extended NATO security community, intra-alliance solidarity 
endowment and exchange. Performing the policy of eFP emerges as a compensatory ritual to 
hold the Alliance together, helping to promote intra-Alliance solidarity in the absence of a 
social or political consensus about the gravity of the ‘Russia-threat’ (Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 
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2018; cf. Kertzer, 1988: 63-69). eFP conveys more about the link between deterrence and allied 
identity than about the supposed threat it is designed to deter.2  
 
The ensuing section outlines the limitations of traditional deterrence theory, aligning with the 
recent interpretive threads of scholarship, advocating an analytical focus on the political effects 
and identity-related significance of deterrence. Unpacking the performative and strategic 
attributes of ritual helps to develop a conceptual scaffolding for theorizing deterrence as a 
ritual-like practice with crucial binding, releasing and restraining functions. I then turn to the 
brief empirical illustration of the argument by way of investigating the ritualization of extended 
conventional deterrence under the umbrella of NATO’s eFP. The conclusion summarizes the 
contributions of the proposed ritual lens to the deterrence literature and delineates the nascent 
lines of research for future studies of security politics through the heuristic device of ritual. 
 
Rational Deterrence Theory and Its Critics 
 
Rational deterrence theory and deterrence strategy as a conflict management practice in 
international relations share an illusion of, and an aspiration for, control (e.g., George and 
Smoke, 1974). The former assumes that a deterrer actor can overcome the problem of 
uncertainty about others’ intentions. The latter proceeds from the premise that an adequate 
aggregation of capabilities and a competent communication of one’s intentions enables to alter 
an opponent’s political preferences without resorting to war (Lebow, 2017). Defining and 
 
2 While a fully-fledged case study of the interaction ritual chains of eFP would naturally include the actions and 
interactions of Russia, the latter’s responses to NATO’s and the United States’ force posture movements in the 
region (e.g., via its Zapad-exercises) remain the subject for future empirical studies due to the scope limitations 
of the current conceptually oriented inquiry. 
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communicating unequivocally one’s commitments to adversaries, along with developing and 
sustaining capabilities to honour them, and conveying credibility to these commitments have 
been standardly held as key components of deterrence’s success as a strategy. Deterrence 
strategy is oftentimes deemed a self-fulfilling prophecy – thinking that it will work already 
supposedly enhances its success (Luke, 1989: 214). Further, the saying and performing of 
deterrence is supposed to exert material effects of actually making the act of deterring to happen 
(cf. Austin, 1962). Credibility has accordingly been deemed the ‘magic ingredient’ of 
deterrence (Freedman, 1989: 96), for ‘[w]hat deterred was not the threat but that it was 
believed’ (Morgan, 2003: 15). Deterrence depends on credibility, but credibility is an 
emotional belief (Mercer, 2010). Ironically for rational deterrence theory’s rulebook for 
successful deterrence, its strict prescriptions have a family resemblance with the rule-bound 
structure of rituals, traditionally rooted in magical thinking. 
 
The vulnerability with the illusion of control lies in the fact that the key of deterrence success 
or failure (i.e. the credibility of a deterrent threat) ultimately rests in the eyes of a would-be 
challenger (Art and Greenhill, 2018: 11). Yet, after canvassing the voluminous literature on 
deterrence,3 Morgan (2003: 164) concludes that ‘even when the deterrer does the right things 
the challenger may still attack’. Determining the success of general deterrence,4 or 
understanding how exactly deterrence does its ‘magic’ (Freedman, 2004: 14) has remained 
 
3 See also Lupovici (2010) and Jervis (1979). 
4 General deterrence concerns anticipating possible threats in the most generic and often hypothetical terms, and 
adopting a posture to deter these unspecified other actors from ever considering becoming ‘would-be’ challengers 
(Morgan, 2003: xvi).  
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empirically equally elusive.5 As Colin S. Gray (2001: 23) observes, ‘[q]uite how general 
deterrence works…is a mystery’; deterrence ‘lacks physical reality’ for its working is, by 
definition, ‘nothing much happening’. The inaction on part of the ‘deterred’ cannot be 
decisively attributed to the efficiency of deterrence alone. Counterintuitively to the 
assumptions of the classical (e.g., Kaufmann, 1954; Brodie, 1959; Schelling, 1966) and formal 
models-based deterrence scholarship (e.g., Powell, 1990; Crawford, 2003), the deterrer does 
not control the situation in practice to the extent rational deterrence theory implies it would.  
 
Generally lauded for its theoretical parsimony, rational deterrence theory remains criticized for 
its apolitical, ahistorical, context-insensitive and altogether unrealistic premises (Jervis, 1979; 
Lebow and Stein, 1989; Zagare and Kilgour, 2000; Morgan, 2003, 2011). Scholars critical of 
the rationalist assumptions of mainstream deterrence theory have challenged the central tenets 
about how deterrence supposedly works: the instrumental rationality of leaders, their risk-
proneness and aptitude for gain-maximization; their freedom of domestic constraints, along 
with their ability to identify themselves as defenders or challengers (Lebow and Stein, 1989: 
223; Morgan, 2003). Not only do parties to a conflict often disagree over who is actually 
attacking whom, rational deterrence theory’s implicit assumption about the shared meaning 
and ways of deterrence remains an empirical fallacy in international relations (Chilton, 1985). 
Arguably, deterrence is socially more intricate than rational deterrence theory makes of it. 
What counts as a deterrent and how much of it is necessary to make deterrence successful 
remains a deeply political question. More fundamentally, rational deterrence theory obscures 
 
5 Immediate deterrence (which gets mobilized when general deterrence is supposed to be failing, by issuing a 
specific threat in response to a pressing short-term threat of attack) is generally considered to fare better in that 
regard (Huth, 1999: 27). 
 10 
how deterrence policies concurrently make assumptions about the reality, create a particular 
sense of reality, and act upon it. 
 
Constructivist scholarship has shown the central components of working deterrence – 
rationality, credibility and resolve – to be social constructions. Zooming in on the social and 
discursive dimensions of deterrence, the fourth wave of deterrence scholarship has underscored 
the intersubjective contexts and meanings of deterrence practices and artefacts (Lupovici, 
2010: 715-716; 2016: 29; Vuori, 2016). The interpretive studies of deterrence have highlighted 
the problematic tendency of rational deterrence theory to depoliticize the social practice of 
deterrence, failing thus to pay attention to ‘what deterrence does politically as deterrence’ 
(Vuori, 2016: 24). Since each enactment of deterrence is concurrently an instantiation of 
intersubjective meanings about what deterrence allegedly stands for, the practice of deterrence 
is a prime example of how intersubjective reality is both spoken and acted into existence (cf. 
Neumann, 2002). The performance of deterrence recreates the reality where deterrence is 
deemed to be a meaningful interaction and conflict management practice in the first place. The 
practice of deterrence hence contributes to the sustenance of a rivalry relationship between the 
deterrer and its would-be challenger, thus preserving the conflict, the violence of which it 
originally sought to avoid (Lebow and Stein, 1994).  
 
Contextually attentive analyses of deterrence note that the practice of issuing deterrent signals 
is not exclusively about an attempted deterring of the behaviour of one’s adversaries: deterrent 
policies may also have other political goals (Freedman, 2004: 59), ranging from justification, 
burdening, and prevention of political moves (Lupovici, 2010: 723), and aiding the 
mobilization of political support to the maintenance of an actor’s self-identity (Lupovici, 2016). 
The performance of deterrence can further offer essential anxiety relief in stress situations. The 
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practice of deterrence provides a deterrer with a sense of control in a situation of crisis or a 
fundamental challenge. It enables the community to reinforce its boundaries and their main 
mission by identifying the evil outside force, and thus underscoring the instrumentality of 
deterrence in maintaining (an illusion of) order for the actor in question.  
 
Amir Lupovici’s social theory of deterrence (2010, 2016, 2019), on which my ritual approach 
builds, has added important insights to understanding the social functions and uses of 
deterrence. Maintaining that deterrence can also be comprehended as an idea, besides its 
textbook strategic and theoretical facets, Lupovici shows how deterrence becomes a crucial 
asset and a mobilizational resource for actors who have internalized deterrence ideas and 
become attached to the pertinent practices. For actors with a deterrer identity, the ability to 
communicate and perform successful deterrence emerges as more than a physical security 
advancement mechanism. Instead, it assumes the form of an ontological security challenge as 
‘[f]or deterrer actors, practicing deterrence is a source of pride and of security of the self’ 
(Lupovici, 2016: 5-6). Instead of a rational response to objective reality, deterrence intervenes 
in reality when it becomes an answer to an actor’s identity need and, by extension, a source of 
its ontological security, internally and externally validating the actor’s self by allowing it to 
sustain a coherent autobiographical narrative and maintain routinized interactions with 
significant others (Lupovici, 2016: 69).   
 
A Ritual Approach to Deterrence 
 
I propose to rethink deterrence as a ritual-like performative practice which has productive 
power beyond its traditionally unproblematized function of dissuading hurtful probes from 
supposed challengers. Conventional reading overlooks that deterrence is also a potent 
collective symbolic resource with important binding, releasing and restraining functions in the 
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praxis of international relations and strategic studies alike (cf. Linklater, 2019). For a deeper 
understanding of the productivity of deterrence as a social practice and an article of faith (cf. 
‘a religious relic’ in IR; Lebow, 2005), I take my cue from Friedrich Kratochwil (2018: 182) 
who maintains that ‘[w]hile for certain practices custom and habit are sufficient, for the 
emergence of “institutions”… productive of “social power,” more sophisticated arrangements 
involving symbols and concepts become necessary.’ Enter ritual. 
 
Ritual features and symbolic action are central to deterrence as a social practice. Ritual is 
constitutive of deterrence insofar as it enables an actor not only to manage uncertainty about 
others’ intentions, but also to mediate the ambiguity of its own signals and accomplish one’s 
overall credibility as a deterrer, not least vis-à-vis the allies in need of protection in an extended 
deterrence predicament. Extended deterrence entails a distinct set of ritual-like political and 
military practices, designed to cohere the deterrer alliance as much as to avert the external 
threat. The symbolic ambiguity of ritual form – for the participants, outside observers, and 
addressees of the ritual might attach very different meanings to it – is part and parcel of its 
power in dealing with the very ambiguity in conveying allied resolve and commitment to 
putative challenger and protégé states in distinct ways. The performance of extended deterrence 
thrives on sustaining constructive ambiguity via interaction ritual chains through which 
exchanges and reproduction of threat, commitment and allied solidarity happen. These intricate 
chains are performative of an alliance as a deterrer actor (and thus more than strategic signals 
conventionally understood): they create affective entanglements, while upholding and 
affording meaning to the practice of deterrence, and embodying, as well as enabling sense-
making of the very practice. Unpacking interaction ritual chains of extended deterrence 
advances understanding of how deterrence is practically ‘done’: how credibility is 
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accomplished vis-à-vis the supposed challenger alongside the reaffirmation of the deterrer 
identity within the deterring community.  
 
To make a case for a ritual account of deterrence, it is necessary to provide a systematic 
conceptualization of ritual first. What follows is a brief exposition of ritual as a performative 
and strategic practice, before unpacking the ritual-like features and functions of deterrence in 
general, and extended deterrence specifically. The theoretical section concludes with situating 
the proposed ritual lens against the backdrop of rational deterrence theory and a practice 
approach6 as important theoretical interlocutors to the framework developed here. 
 
Ritual as a Performative Practice 
I understand ritual as a distinct performative practice: ritual is what ritual does, its essence does 
not exist independently of practice (cf. Alexander, 2006: 528-529). The performative quality 
of ritual is key for grasping its constitutive role for deterrence as a human institution, and a 
framework for enacting a particular political agency. Ritual is performative alike to a speech 
act where the act of speech effectively constitutes the action (Austin, 1962; Vuori, 2016). It is 
more than just a speech act, however: by bringing together bodies and their movement, ritual 
 
6 Note that just as there is no such thing as the theory of ritual but a host of theoretical perspectives focusing on 
ritual as their central object of study, there is also no singular practice approach to deterrence. Whereas Morgan’s 
take on deterrence as practice leans towards a Bourdieu-inspired sociological framework, where shared 
‘background knowledge’ of deterrence practitioners plays an important role (Morgan, 2011: 149; Bourdieu, 1977), 
an alternative, philosophically framed understanding of practice would present deterrence as a special kind of 
social practice, binding its participants to its common rules without thereby binding them to a common goal or 
purpose (i.e. a ‘constitutive’ practice à la Lechner and Frost, 2018: 138). For distinct takes on practice theory in 
IR, see Adler and Pouliot (2011), Lechner and Frost (2018), and Kratochwil (2018). 
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generates tacit connections between thinking and acting for its participants. Ritual promises 
insights to practices that a rationalist approach might dismiss as irrelevant (e.g., the constitution 
of agency) or irrational (for the latter’s unwillingness to consider real bodies in real places). As 
embodied interactions, rituals enable ‘knowledge acquired by the body’ (Ringmar, 2020). The 
performative constitution of agency works through interaction ritual chains which energize 
participants and attach them to each other (Collins, 2004), capturing the reiterative process of 
being constituted and becoming a subject.  
 
Ritual performances ‘bring discourses and audiences together’, ‘framing’ situations and 
enacting ‘scripts’ in an aesthetically compelling theatrical form (Ringmar, 2012: 7-8; 2016). 
Through their attentiveness to ‘place, setting, timing, and interaction’, rituals translate abstract 
ideas into empirically concrete and emotionally relatable practices (Smith and Alexander, 
2005: 26). Rites perform as they ‘not only mark transitions but also create them’; as ritual 
performance not only ‘symbolizes a social relationship or change’, but ‘also actualizes it’ 
(Alexander, 2006: 41). Rituals are performative for enacting and embodying the symbolic: they 
not ‘only show respect for sacred objects, but also constitute objects as sacred’ (Collins, 2004: 
17).  
 
By performing and enacting the ‘necessary abstractions’ of world politics (such as deterrence), 
public and explicitly political rituals offer an interface with the ‘real world’, enabling to deal 
with its perennial ambiguity (Seligman and Weller, 2012). Through its emphasis on 
performative action and the related creation of an ‘as-if’ universe, ritual allows us to 
accommodate difference and to live with ambiguity, not to remove or resolve it (Seligman and 
Weller, 2012: 25, 95, 113). As a symbolic means of bringing things intellectually and 
emotionally together (cf. Walzer, 1967: 194), ritual can create a sense of unity in the absence 
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of social and political consensus about its meaning or specific policy implications of the symbol 
in question (Kertzer, 1988: 69; Oren and Solomon, 2015: 325).  
 
Ritual as a Strategic Practice 
As ritualized ways of acting ‘negotiate authority, self, and society’ (Bell, 1992: 8), performing 
rituals can have strategic advantages. The dramatization and mobilization of ritual features 
intrinsic to deterrence can by implication be a strategic move on part of political actors.7 Since 
collective actors need credibility more than national actors do in regard to general deterrence 
(Morgan, 2003: 193), the extended deterrence relationships are particularly prone to the 
ritualized production of deterrence. Arguably, there is a rational reason for rituals as ‘all 
symbolic action is instrumental with respect to some class of ends’ (Chwe, 2001; Munn, 1973: 
593). As a purposeful mediation of ambiguity, the ritualization of deterrence has manifold 
political benefits and practical, strategically valued results. The ritualized performance of 
deterrence can help to conceal the disagreements behind the apparent allied commitment in 
regard to the frightening what-if scenarios of an actual attack by the putative challenger (cf. 
Oren and Solomon, 2015). Repeated chains of deterrence interactions are capable of producing 
and revitalizing a positive sense of solidarity and unity – collective emotional effervescence 
constituting the social bond within the alliance (cf. Collins, 2004). The combined strategic and 
symbolic logic of action is embodied in interaction ritual chains as the central operating 
mechanism of extended deterrence wherein utilitarian exchanges of allied commitment, debts 
of gratitude, and defence are embedded in the performance of ritual solidarity (and presumably 
also its production, albeit this might not be as frictionless in practice as the theory alludes). 
The ritualized performance of deterrence makes the abstract notion of deterrence tangible for 
 
7 Not to be confused with ‘strategic deterrence’ (as the equivalent of nuclear deterrence) and the discussion of 
deterrence strategy in traditional deterrence theory. 
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the participants in this interaction, facilitating the exchange of ‘emotional energy’ between 
them and reaffirming group membership (Collins, 2004). This is crucial in extended deterrence 
where interaction rituals need to further accomplish the production of deterrer solidarity, 
thereby actualizing the identity of the collective deterrer actor. Akin to a bundle of 
performances ‘constitutive of the state as we know it’ (Ringmar, 2016: 116; cf. Weber, 1998), 
the ritual performance of deterrence is constitutive of an actor self-identifying as a deterrent 
actor. 
 
A ritual approach to deterrence is accordingly interested in the political work of deterrence 
rituals, their psychological, social, and political effects, along with their socially determined 
effectiveness (or productivity). Who ritualizes, how, with which material and ideational 
resources, and with what kind of affective, discursive, and material effects are the 
methodologically relevant questions to pursue from a ritual lens of analysis (Bell, 1997; 
Ringmar, 2012). As such, a ritual approach shares a common ground with a practice-centric 
understanding of deterrence as a contextually specific practical activity which varies, changes 
and evolves historically, socially and culturally (Morgan, 2011: 140; see Table 3).  
 
Notwithstanding, ritual remains a slippery subject to pin down. The scholars focusing on the 
ritualization of social practices as a culturally strategic way of acting and exercising power 
acknowledge the ignorance of ritualized agents about ‘what what they are doing does’ (Bell, 
1992: 108). Regardless of its productive power, conventionally viewed as reproducing the 
ingrained social structure (Durkheim, 2008; Goffman, 1967), ritual remains internally fragile 
and cannot be entirely controlled by its ‘ritual masters’, all the more in case of large-scale 
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political rituals (Rappaport, 1999).8 Since a political ritual can conceal as much as it performs, 
it is crucial to pay attention to how power is reflected, as well as challenged, in and through it 
(Bell, 1992). 
 
Ritual Features, Functions and Effects of Deterrence 
 
Deterrence contains common attributes characteristic to ritual-like practices, including 
formalism, traditionalism, disciplined routines, rule-governance, sacral symbolism, and 
performance (Bell, 1997: 138-169). The formula of effective deterrence conventionally entails 
the ‘three C-s’: capability, communication, and credibility. The aforementioned criteria must 
be met for a deterrent threat to succeed per the textbook understanding of the ‘code’ of 
deterrence (‘formalism’). Deterrence is made of intricate ‘interaction rituals’ or ‘ritual games’ 
(cf. Goffman, 1967), providing formal conventions for social interaction vis-à-vis the putative 
challenger and, in case of extended deterrence, towards the ally in need of protection. The 
patterned routines of deterrence draw on the historical practices of deterrence (or previous 
encounters in interaction ritual chains; cf. Collins, 2004: 5), appealing on the symbolic power 
and the supposed naturalness of deterrence as a conflict management practice 
(‘traditionalism’).9 The performance of deterrence has a specific choreography of actions, 
wherein the restraint and self-control required by all parties of the interaction ritual chain is 
often geared to exquisite detail (‘disciplined routines/invariance’). The implicit rules of 
deterrence (e.g., the ‘nuclear taboo’) channel, constrain, and simultaneously legitimate the 
 
8 For a focussed discussion on the disruptive effect of rituals, see Aalberts et al. (2020). 
9 For example, Russia’s countermoves to NATO’s recent BALTOPS exercises in the Baltic Sea have been quoted 
as ‘strongly reminiscent of the Cold War era’, mirroring the sequence of NATO’s respective maneuvers by 
standard simulations of sinking an ‘enemy’ submarine or simulating a missile strike on ‘enemy’ ships 
(Prokopenko and Goncharenko, 2019).  
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violent interaction of opposed groups in particular ways (‘rule-governance’; cf. Bell, 1997: 
154). Regardless of the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons in practice, deterrence 
strategies and theories in international security have attached special symbolism to nuclear 
weapons,10 making missiles effective already in peacetime for their ability to influence political 
assessments in target states and societies. Likewise, symbolic significance is often allocated to 
specific places of deterrent value or vulnerability, such as the Fulda Gap for NATO during the 
Cold War years and the Suwałki Corridor in the age of the eFP. Affording special meaning to 
certain sites effectively sacralizes the borders of the community to be defended against the 
putative challenger (‘sacral symbolism’).11 
 
Performance is the defining feature among the ritual-like qualities of deterrence as a specific 
type of demonstration, communication and constitution of a threat, credibility and resolve. The 
performance of deterrence’s constituent practices charged with a publicly deterrent intent is 
concurrently performative of deterrence, communicating the very intent via ritual-like 
practices. Conceptualizing deterrence as a performative practice brings to light its political 
functions and effects. Extended deterrence is binding for the deterring collective via everyday 
training practices and more spectacle-like military exercises, integrating the multinational 
military forces, generating the participants’ affective investment and thus helping to establish 
a group identity for the people carrying out their skills collectively by producing their 
commitment to the common goal via common practice. Military exercises and training produce 
‘ritual effectiveness’ (‘collective effervescence’), loading the participants with energy and 
 
10 For seminal studies on nuclear rites, see Cohn (1987), Benford and Kurtz (1987), Gusterson (1996), and 
Tannenwald (2007).  
11 By extension, the routine Russian probing of the Baltic airspace appears as a symbolic penetration of the north-
eastern membrane of the Alliance.  
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attaching them to each other, generating collective solidarity (‘re-fusing societies’; Alexander, 
2006: 29-30; cf. Collins, 2004: 91). While binding the deterring community and reassuring the 
allies, extended deterrence rituals are concurrently exclusive. The very act of forming an 
alliance is an act of deterrence. The effects of rituals are indeed not bound to the generation of 
solidarity: rituals can also ‘differentiate the group from other groups, invest the hierarchy of 
the group with sacred properties, and articulate emotions to a world view or mythology, 
however imperfectly and diversely understood by participants’ (Barkawi, 2017: 175).  
 
Deterrence further has a releasing function for a deterrer (collective) actor or ‘role in 
legitimating the relaxation of intra-societal controls on force in the sphere of external relations’ 
(Linklater, 2019: 950). Military exercises and ‘war games’ have a deterrent function, 
communicating deterrent intent. But they are also ritualized play of an imagined war with the 
one supposed to be deterred. They could thus be understood as representational rituals – 
symbolic of salient features of social reality (Goodin, 1978: 277-278). Military exercises are 
embodiments of mimetic violence: they mimic war (usually euphemized by those holding the 
drill as ‘self-defence scenarios’) by imagining and playing through the difficult what-if 
situations, thus indicating the participants’ deepest security concerns and/or ambitions. The 
mock battles, training manoeuvers, war games and computer simulations are, in effect, a 
ritualized confrontation of the ‘other’ – the one to be deterred, or challenged, respectively 
(Benford and Kurtz, 1987: 477). At the same time, deterrence symbolizes an attempt at 
restraining the use of force between the supposed defender and would-be challenger. 
Deterrence rules channel, constrain and simultaneously legitimate the violent interaction 
between the deterrer and its putative challenger (cf. Bell, 1997: 154). In the realm of nuclear 
and conventional deterrence, mock exercises enable to play through the anticipated horror of 
the actual war in a controlled environment, thus furnishing the participants with a sense of 
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security (Benford and Kurtz, 1987: 477). Alike to religious rites, deterrence rituals can reduce 
anxiety and thus have an ontologically reassuring effect.  
 
Ritual Practices of Extended Deterrence 
 
The enactment of extended deterrence and the ingrained practical knowledge underpinning the 
related ‘sense of a game’ draws on a range of explicitly dramatic (ceremonial) ritual spectacles 
and more minute practices of signalling a threat, conveying a promise, showing resolve and 
reassuring the allies of the unity of an alliance (see Table 1). Such ritualized performances 
range from large-scale military exercises and declaratory commitments articulated in high-
profile political statements to the movement of troops, training and simulation exercises, and 
the everyday ritualization of working-level communication. 
 
Table 1. Rituals of extended deterrence 
 Overt rituals/spectacles Ritual-like everyday 
practices (overt and 
covert) 





Military Large-scale military 
exercises 
 
Passing the baton- 
ceremonies of 








As a form of communication, the particular rituals of extended deterrence, making a claim of 
and ‘acting out’ allied deterrence in practice, hold deterrence together as a construct that is 
deemed politically necessary. Extended deterrence rites, such as political declarations, force 
posture movements and military exercises, include explicitly ritualized public affirmations of 
extended deterrence and defence pledge. Common military practices, in particular, help to 
generate performative cohesion for a collective deterrent actor – the key effect of deterrence 
rituals for the deterrer community. Capturing ritual’s unique ability to mediate ambiguity and 
live together with difference, performative cohesion does not imply that participants have a 
single common identity; instead, it suggests ‘a certain amount of consensus over what an ideal 
identity or way of life should be’ (Zubrycki, 2016: 25). The ritual performance of extended 
deterrence, and the ritualization of particular elements of the actor’s response to the perceived 
threat, for instance via large-scale military exercises and high-level political statements, makes 
the abstraction of deterrence empirically available, affectively relatable, and effectively ‘real’ 
for the deterring community. 
 
A ritual lens highlights the co-presence of actors and multiple audiences for the successful 
performance of deterrence (see Table 2; cf. Lupovici, 2019: 183). A performative event of 
extended deterrence is delivered by manifold interaction ritual chains between the deterrer 
actor(s) and various audiences, ranging from the public and elite of the putative challenger to 
the domestic audiences of the patron and protégé states, and the wider international community 
(cf. Collins, 2004; Goffman, 1967). Some audiences are actually present (such as those 
attending a political speech on the spot of delivery); others are implied (or imaginary). 
Different audiences will judge the same performance on different merits, inducing multiple 
signalling on part of a deterrer (cf. Neumann and Sending, 2020). The delineation of audience-
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specific emphases of deterrence signalling and performance allows to zoom in on the distinct 
functions of specific deterrence rituals in an extended deterrence setting.  For example, what 
counts as convincing of deterrence’s credibility in the eyes of the putative challenger (e.g., 
Russia for NATO in its north-eastern flank), the domestic audiences of the patron state (e.g., 
framework and contributing nations of the Alliance’s eFP battlegroups) and those of the 
protégé states (e.g., Poland and the Baltic Three), the collective actor as a whole (e.g., NATO 
as a security community with its distinct political and military bodies, such as the North 
Atlantic Council and SHAPE), and international community more broadly, can significantly 
vary. For the pertinent interaction chains to generate solidarity within the alliance, the actors 
need to share a mutual awareness, a common focus of attention and an emotional mood besides 
physical co-presence (Collins, 2004: 32). 
 
Table 2. Interaction ritual chains of extended deterrence 
Actor Audience Political function 
The deterrer 
actor/patron 











The public/elite of the 











Legitimizing the deployment of 
forces for the domestic audiences 
of the patron state and the 




Solidarity exchange and generation; 




Negotiating international order and 
the actor’s identity (Mediating 
ambiguity) 




Playing one’s part in the allied 
deterrent 




















Playing one’s part in the allied 
interaction ritual chain (Mediating 
ambiguity; soliciting solidarity) 
 
 
Legitimizing the deployment of 
allied forces for the domestic 










An empirical focus on multi-targeted deterrence rituals allows for a combined context-sensitive 
analysis of strategic and symbolic logics of action in the performance of deterrence. At one 
level, deterrence can be instrumentalized (ritualized) as a means for achieving specific ends via 
evocative performances (e.g., in order to magnify the political significance of militarily light 
tripwire forces); at another, deterrence rituals can order and reorganize actor experiences, as 
deterrence interaction ritual chains establish rhythmic mutual entrainment between the actors 
(Collins, 2004; cf. Munn, 1973). Ritual (as an aspect of deterrence) and ritualization (or 
deliberate dramatization of the ritual attributes of deterrence) hence emerge as important 
explanans for the mediation of ambiguity and attempted credibility control over an actor’s 
performance in an extended deterrence setting. Meanwhile, specific rituals of deterrence, 
bearing family resemblance to rites of passage (e.g., Gusterson, 1996), exchange, sacrifice, 
solidarity, purification and exorcism can be the explanandum themselves as instances of 
symbolic action of this core strategic practice in world politics. 
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Ritual Approach in Context 
To summarize, a ritual approach shares some elements of both rational deterrence theory and 
practice-centric reading of deterrence, but with distinct emphases and conceptualizations. 
 
For rational deterrence theory, deterrence is an instrumentally rational management of security 
dilemma, pursued by agents with fixed identities, calculating their optimal moves premised on 
a cost-benefit analysis. Deterrence operates through a straightforward and materially 
determined capability-communication-credibility mechanism, whereas credibility rests largely 
on exogenously given interests and the scale of harmful consequences that can be inflicted by 
a deterring actor. The logic of rational deterrence theory boils down to: I think, therefore I deter 
(Lebow and Stein, 1989; see Table 3). 
 
In contrast to formal modelling and rationalist assumptions guiding traditional deterrence 
theory, a practice-oriented study of deterrence asks empirically interested questions, e.g., how 
governments attempt to practice deterrence; what is actually done in deterrence situations, and 
which factors appear to determine what governments do (Morgan, 1986: 79-80). For practice-
oriented scholarship, the display and credibility of deterrence is accordingly dependent on 
empirical practices: actions or ‘actually operating deterrence’ rather than pre-calculated 
theoretical formulae are the most important factor determining credibility of deterrence from a 
practice perspective (Morgan, 2011: 160-163). A practice-based reading of the logic of 
deterrence includes the logic of habit (deterrence as habitus – a thing that is habitually done) 
and the posture of competence (deterrence as practical knowledge; e.g., Morgan, 2011: 149). 
As ‘agents exist by a dint of what they do’ (Neumann and Sending, 2020: 1), an alliance appears 
as the ontological effect of its various practices, including deterrence (cf. Weber, 1998: 78). 
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The logic of action for practice-centric understanding of deterrence accordingly amounts to: I 
deter, therefore I am.  
 
A ritual approach expands on the practice lens by highlighting the circular dynamic between 
the performative constitution of agency through practice and actor’s intentional orchestration 
of an ingrained deterrer identity through performance. It draws attention to how a collective 
self is performed via the ‘ritual games’ of deterrence, along with the consolidation of a reality 
where conflict management by deterrence is perceived as natural and right (cf. Bell, 1997: 129; 
Oren and Solomon, 2015: 335). From a ritual perspective, the practices of interest are more 
than routines and/or ‘competent performances’ (Adler and Pouliot, 2011). Ritual differs from 
habitual practice for its rule-boundedness and reflexivity (Giesen, 2006: 339): it is a more 
accomplished and less automatic set of culturally strategic actions (Bell, 1992: 90) with 
performance as its defining feature (Rappaport, 1999: 37), and performativity as its core effect 
(Butler, 1997). The notion of performance entails an audience able to recognize and appraise 
the practice (as opposed to individually performed habits) as correct or incorrect (Adler and 
Pouliot, 2011: 6-7). What is at stake in performing deterrence is not just the performance of 
‘right’ practices, but also of the subject in question – the creation and upholding of an identity 
(cf. Neumann and Sending, 2020). A ritual understanding of deterrence is premised on 
emphatically identity-bound rationality: a deterring actor is supposed to actualize its embedded 
identity as a deterrer through the interaction ritual chains of deterrence (cf. Ringmar, 2016). 
From a ritual perspective, a deterring actor is hence not just the ontological effect of 
performatively enacted deterrence practices (I deter, therefore I am), but its logic of action 
entails conscious advancement of an embedded deterrer identity (I am, therefore I deter) (see 
Table 3). Still, the relationship between deterring as performative practice and actor’s identity 
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is more of a continuum: the difference between ‘I deter, therefore I am’ and ‘I am, therefore I 
deter’ is a matter of variation and emphasis, not fundamental type. 
 







Deterrence as Instrumental 
management of 
security dilemma 
Contextual practice Performative of 
deterrer identity 



























Logic of action Strategic 
calculation of 
expected returns 
Logic of practice 
(including logic of 






(premised on fixed 
preferences) 
Caption I think, therefore I 
deter 
I deter, therefore I 
am  
I am, therefore I 
deter  
 
Attentiveness to the ritualized performance of deterrence nuances our understanding of the 
deterrence and collective identity nexus, making evident what is at stake in deterrence for a 
military alliance with deterrence as its constitutive practice. Acknowledging the ritual features 
of deterrence illuminates central emotive, political and material dynamics of this international 
security macro practice (cf. Lechner and Frost, 2018) which remain unaccounted for in 
traditional deterrence scholarship and conceptually schematic in the existing social 
theorizations of deterrence. Such dynamics include the affective and political performativity 
of deterrence, along with the symbolic ladenness and mobilization of particular spaces and 
weaponry in the practice of deterrence.  
 
A ritual approach to extended deterrence deepens and nuances the understanding of deterrence 
as an ontological, and not merely physical security practice, elucidating the mechanics of 
collective identity consolidation via specific ritual-like activities. Recognizing deterrence as a 
ritual-like practice offers a more compelling ontology of deterrence, along with an empirically 
surpassing way of studying its performance, credibility and assumed effect. Being mindful 
about the ritual features and political benefits of deterrence sheds light on the ways such a 
central ‘necessary fiction’ in international security theory and practice comes to be believed 
and shared in the first place, together with the solidarity, emotional energy, and affective 
investments it generates. 
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If interaction ritual chains are the micro-mechanisms of extended deterrence, we should see 
ordered sequences of symbolic social exchanges on display in public practices of allied 
deterrence (e.g., the deployment of forward forces, the training of multinational battlegroups, 
large-scale military exercises). The performative efficiency of the issued deterrent and the 
projected allied credibility might be evidenced in the development of affective entanglements 
(such as increased empathy, trust, and solidarity) through interactions between the deterrer and 
protégé actors in the collective performances of deterrence. While there is no easy way of 
methodologically distinguishing the performance of solidarity from its actual production 
through deterrence interactions, a combination of documentation analysis and ethnographic 
methods (field observation, expert interviews) to disentangle actors’ stated intentions,  
performative actions and their experienced effects, combined with a genealogical interest in 
the long durée work of particular discourses in a non-positivist case study research design 
should yield concrete empirical insights.  
 
NATO’s eFP is a good case to demonstrate the analytical purchase of a ritual approach to 
deterrence for various reasons. It provides an apt illustration for the theoretical argument about 
ritualization helping to mediate ambiguity in extended deterrence. It also serves as an exemplar 
of allied identity dynamics underpinning the supposedly universal ‘deterrence logic’. As the 
first deployment of combat-ready troops in the eastern part of the Alliance, eFP is a critical 
case for tapping into the specificities of post-Cold War extended deterrence which remains 
relatively underexplored compared to its Cold War-era predecessor.12 Further, a ritual lens on 
NATO’s reasons for deploying a tripwire rather than a more massive allied conventional force 
 
12  NATO’s tailored forward presence in the Black Sea region constitutes another possible case to be explored 
through a ritual deterrence framework. As a paradigmatic Cold War-era tripwire, the oft-cited (if stretched) West 
Berlin-analogy, would provide an intriguing comparative historical case study.  
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in the potentially contentious Baltic region enables to gain insights that the instrumentally 
strategic logic of the said preference obscures. A militarily weightier conventional allied force 
posture is accordingly avoided not just for the strategic calculation of a more massive allied 
presence potentially creating a dangerous spiral in the region and thus beating the purpose of 
deterring Russia’s military probes in the first place. NATO’s symbolic eFP in the eastern Baltic 
region is also symbolic in the broader sense of the term: keeping NATO’s forward posture 
numerically small signifies keeping up with NATO’s self-identification as a defensive 
alliance.13 eFP emerges as a ritualized display of NATO as a historically deterrent alliance, 
seeking to make it palpable as such for the modern public. 
 
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence as Ritualized Deterrence 
 
NATO’s performance of its eFP strategy illustrates the standard struggles of extended 
deterrence to simultaneously reassure the allies and communicate resolve to the would-be 
challenger. Adopted at the 2016 Summit in Warsaw and implemented since early 2017 with 
four multinational battalion-sized battlegroups (i.e. 1000-1400 contingents each) deployed to 
Poland and the three Baltic states, led by the four framework nations of the US, UK, Canada 
and Germany respectively, the efficiency of eFP’s strategic deterrence relies heavily on follow-
on reinforcements being deployed on short notice (‘Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 2016: para. 
40; ‘NATO Readiness Action Plan’, 2016). Accompanied by pre-positioning of equipment, 
infrastructure, and enhanced exercises, NATO’s forward presence in the region is deemed to 
send ‘a very strong signal of NATO unity, NATO resolve and NATO strength’ (Stoltenberg, 
2017), supposedly further amplified by the multinational composition of the battlegroups, with 
 
13 As NATO Secretary General puts the point: ‘NATO’s presence in the Baltic region is defensive, it is 
proportionate, we are here not to provoke conflict but we are here to prevent conflict’ (Stoltenberg, 2017). 
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a variety of contributing nations evidencing ‘the strength of the transatlantic bond’ and being 
‘a tangible reminder that an attack on one is an attack against all’ (‘Boosting NATO’s 
presence’, 2019; Gottemoeller, 2018).14 The recurring rhetorical emphasis on the ‘robustness’ 
and ‘combat-readiness’ of the eFP battlegroups by NATO spokespersons and representatives 
of the lead nations counterbalances the numerically modest and non-permanent force posture 
(which, meanwhile, helps with soothing Russia’s concerns about NATO’s forward presence in 
the region). As such, it is aimed to signal a deterrent response ‘in a measured, proportionate, 
responsible way’ rather than ‘mirror what Russia does, tank by tank, or plane by plane, or 
soldier by soldier’ (Stoltenberg, 2017).  
 
Yet, many question the immediate deterrent value of the arguably costly signalling by the 
forward posture of Allied conventional forces in the Baltic region in symbolic rather than actual 
numbers necessary for thwarting a full-scale Russian attack, given Russia’s time and space 
advantage over NATO in the region, and the ability of its A2/AD capabilities to obstruct the 
access of the allied reinforcement forces in case of an actual crisis (Zapfe, 2017; Halas, 2019; 
Lanoszka and Hunzeker, 2019). While nested in NATO’s overall deterrence and defence 
posture, including nuclear deterrence and missile defence, eFP remains mostly a symbolic 
commitment on NATO’s part due to its light and rotational ‘mini-coalitions of the willing’ 
rather than permanent presence which is deemed insufficient for striking back should Russia 
actually seek to test NATO’s resolve in the Baltic region (Stoicescu and Järvenpää, 2019; 
Shlapak and Johnson, 2016). Member states diverge on the severity of the threat posed by 
Russia: while the eastern flank countries wish the Alliance to focus on keeping Russian 
aggression at bay, the proponents of ‘global NATO’ tend to see the Alliance’s mission of 
pacifying the Euro-Atlantic area as already largely accomplished (Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 
 
14 See further ‘NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence Factsheet’ (2019). 
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2018). With President Trump’s occasional threats to withdraw the US from NATO, the 
southern European allies’ distinctly less concerned take on the threat from Russia, along with 
Germany’s and Turkey’s more pragmatically cooperative relations with Russia added to the 
mix, the intra-alliance strategic divergence is potentially weakening NATO’s collective resolve 
in an actual crisis. 
 
Against this backdrop, the set-up of the eFP tripwire as ‘a clear and unambiguous 
demonstration of Allied solidarity, determination, and ability to defend NATO’s population 
and territory against any aggression’ (‘Common Declaration of the Defence Ministers’, 2017) 
is more significant politically for binding NATO together than for rendering Russia’s 
hypothetical fait accompli in the Baltic region militarily difficult. The ritual practices of the 
eFP ‘are not only a gesture of assurance and a magical defence against vague threats; they are 
also a claim to importance for what is being guarded’ (Collins, 2004: 76). The ritualistic 
mobilization of allied solidarity in the eFP practices of extended deterrence highlights the 
significance afforded to maintaining NATO’s credibility as a deterrer. The reiterative 
performances of allied solidarity help to build actual unity within the Alliance for ‘[w]hat 
creates the solidarity is the sharp rise in ritual intensity of social interaction, as very large 
numbers of persons focus their attention on the same event, are reminded constantly that other 
people are focusing their attention by the symbolic signals they give out, and hence are swept 
up into a collective mood’ (Collins, 2004: 55). While performing extended deterrence through 
political messages, positioning of troops, the movement of materiel and regular joint exercises, 
the micro-practices of the eFP ‘re-fuse’ the allied community lacking consensus on the Russia-
threat (cf. Alexander, 2006).  
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The credibility of allied commitment, capability, and interoperability is performed and sought 
to be accomplished via chains of ritual interactions between NATO spokespeople, eFP 
framework, contributing, and host nations, each navigating distinct sets of ambiguities. As a 
first overt ritual spectacle of NATO’s re-gearing of deterrence in the post-Crimea strategic 
reality in Europe, US President Obama’s public speech held in Tallinn, Estonia on his way to 
the NATO 2014 Summit in Wales signalled a high-level political commitment to the region’s 
defence by the lead patron state of the Alliance. The emotive rhetorical affirmation of the US 
extended deterrence and defence pledge by NATO’s primus inter pares offered a ritualized 
production of the Alliance’s renewed deterrent intent vis-à-vis Russia while making the allied 
reassurance of the Baltic states emotionally tangible.15 As a ritualistic mobilization of solidarity 
and security, the speech reiterated the boundary between the inside and outside of the North 
Atlantic security community, with an eye to keeping Russia at safe distance. In the meantime, 
the ritualized affirmation about NATO’s Article 5 being ‘crystal clear’ concealed the 
constructive ambiguity of the language actually used in NATO’s charter, preserving a degree 
of flexibility for allies in their response to an armed attack.16  
 
The deployment of forward forces (‘putting NATO into the scene’), the training of the 
multinational battlegroups along with the regular armed forces, and more frequent large-scale 
 
15
 ‘…we will defend our NATO allies, and that means every ally. In this alliance there are no old members or 
new members, no junior partners or senior partners. They’re just allies, pure and simple, and we will defend the 
territorial integrity of every single ally. /---/ We have a solemn duty to each other. Article 5 is crystal clear. An 
attack on one is an attack on all. /--/ We’ll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for 
Lithuania. You lost your independence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again’ (Obama, 2014).  
16 ‘Each…will assist…by taking…such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force’. – The 
North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 5. 
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military exercises in the territorially exposed and arguably politically vulnerable Baltic region 
constitute the core military practices and publicly palpable insignia of NATO’s contemporary 
conventional deterrence performance toward Russia (cf. Table 2). These practices are highly 
symbolic due to their unprecedentedness in the post-Cold War era, as well as notably ritualized 
in their framing and dramatization of the eFP deterrent. As gestures of assurance and defence, 
exercises such as Anaconda-2016, Saber Knight 2017, Saber Strike, BALTOPS, Steadfast 
Javelin, Iron Wolf, Eager Leopard, and Integration Capstone also constitute a claim to 
importance for NATO’s allied cohesion and deterrent resolve in the region, further amplified 
via streaming pertinent video captions with recurring hashtags (#WeAreNATO; 
#StrongerTogether), and a strategic display of the multinational flags and symbols of the 
contributing troops  (e.g., ‘Exercise Iron Spear 1902’, 2019). The forward presence of NATO’s 
combat-ready forces symbolically marks Poland’s and the Baltic states’ full incorporation as 
equal subjects in the embrace of NATO’s collective defence pledge, reiterating the external 
boundaries of the Alliance. The eFP solidifies NATO’s grand eastern enlargement in practice 
and extends materially the collective defence guarantee to the vulnerable fringes of the 
Alliance. The large-scale exercises in the north-eastern flank of the Alliance formalize the 
Article 5 promise in the region which prior to the crisis in Ukraine relied predominantly on 
NATO Air Policing mission as the expression of solidarity within the Alliance. The symbolic 
weight of NATO’s enhanced military presence in the region is not supposed to go unnoticed 
by Russia’s leaders for ‘when NATO troops exercise in …the Baltic states, they are operating 
nearly as close to the Russian heartland as Wehrmacht panzers penetrated in 1941-1942’ 
(Shlapak and Johnson, 2016: 14).  
 
In the interaction ritual chains of eFP, the everyday drills and more ceremonial collective 
military exercises rely on group participation, collective focus and investment – generating and 
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binding the group together in the course of the training and exercising, whilst evoking 
sentiments of unity and fellow feeling (cf. Collins, 2004: 91; Barkawi, 2017: 172-179). The 
very practices of eFP are the mechanisms of deterrence’s effects, exercising their power simply 
through the allied participation in them. Such exercises and practices produce ‘ritual 
effectiveness’ which ‘energizes the participants and attaches them to each other, increases their 
identification with the symbolic objects of communication, and intensifies the connection of 
the participants and the symbolic objects with the observing audience, the relevant 
“community” at large’ (Alexander, 2006: 29-30). Military training is hence not just about 
learning to smoothly function together: above all, it is ‘establishing identity with the group who 
carry out their skills collectively’ (Collins, 2004: 91). The message here ‘isn’t just one of 
combat readiness, it’s also of multinational togetherness’ (‘Exercise Iron Wolf’, 2017). 
 
The concept of ‘interaction ritual chain’ captures the rationale and dynamics of practicing 
extended deterrence for NATO cohesion, reflecting the solidarity provision and the exchange 
of mutually accumulated debts via the very practice of eFP. The performance of solidarity by 
NATO through the eFP feeds on the East European sacrifices made in the course of the Allied 
and US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The proportionally significant Polish and Baltic 
contributions to these campaigns could be considered as not just quid pro quo-type of attempts 
to gain diplomatic capital in the eyes of important NATO allies, but ritual investments in the 
collective defence chain of the allied relationship in question (cf. Jakobsen et al., 2018), on the 
assumption that sacrifice generates solidarity in the remaining members of solidary groups 
(Barkawi, 2017). eFP emerges as a ritual consummation of sorts for the deployment ground of 
the Alliance’s restored deterrence mission, as it displays the rise of the social stock of NATO’s 
eastern flank states in the ‘market’ of intra-alliance interaction patterns. An emphasis on 
solidarity exchange is a staple of ceremonial and quotidian practices of eFP, such as transfer 
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of authority rites at the respective battle groups and diplomatic tweets from the Baltic 
representatives thanking the eFP contributing nations for their service. Both the patron and the 
protégé states in these interaction ritual chains highlight the eFP recipient states’ previous and 
ongoing military contributions to the Allied missions and security (e.g., their defence-
spending) to reassure the respective domestic audiences of their ‘worthiness’ of the Allied 
solidarity endowment via the eFP (cf. Table 2; e.g., Stoltenberg, 2019a).  
 
NATO’s reaffirmation of deterrence after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014 has 
provided the Alliance with a set of embedded existential parameters of how the world functions 
and where is NATO’s own supposed place within that world.17 It has also opened up the space 
for regenerating the Allied communitas, by emphasizing the continuing relevance of deterrence 
as a ‘glue’ keeping the original allies and the post-Cold War additions to NATO together (cf. 
Turner, 1982). The ritualized reaffirmation of deterrence in the eFP discourse and practice 
appears as an attempt to embody the group solidarity within the Alliance, to formalize the 
mutual defence pledge in practice, and thereby continue to guard and enact a West-kept world 
order. Particularly for security alliances, a strengthened group solidarity emerges from the 
delineation of the common enemy. Performing solidarity via eFP, NATO effectively performs 
itself (Schlag, 2017). The militarily challenging, albeit politically highly symbolic 
multinational set-up of the eFP battlegroups is consequently framed as a core composite of 
NATO’s deterrent in the region: ‘so if there should be an attack, the attacker knows that he’s 
engaging not only the Baltic States and Poland, he is engaging the entire Alliance’ 
(Gottemoeller, 2019). Intra-alliance solidarity and efficient extended deterrence thus emerge 
as the reverse sides of NATO’s self-enactment as a defensive alliance: NATO deters, because 
it is NATO. 
 




This article set out to characterize ritual as a crucial feature of deterrence in general, and 
elucidate the nature of a ritual perspective as an analytical framework from which to approach 
the mediation of ambiguity in extended deterrence. Acknowledging the ritual attributes of 
deterrence offers an empirically better-grounded way of studying the signalling game of 
deterrence: the sought credibility, performance, and the assumed effect or success of 
deterrence, provided the inclusion of the supposed deterree’s reading of the efficiency of 
deterrence in the analysis (Tables 2 and 3). The laboriousness of issuing a credible threat to the 
potential challenger is accentuated in situations of extended deterrence where the deterrer 
actors and allies seeking protection struggle with manifold uncertainties. Ritualization or 
deliberate dramatization of particular ritual-like attributes of deterrence enables a collective 
deterrer actor to constructively mediate ambiguity in an extended deterrence predicament. A 
focus on the ritual features of allied deterrence brings to the fore the process of generating 
solidarity (if not necessarily succeeding in this goal in practice) and making a military alliance 
empirically relatable to its constituent members. 
 
While a thick description of NATO’s public re-affirmation of its staple security practice since 
the 2014 Ukraine crisis remains to be executed in the future iterations of the proposed 
framework, an examination of extended deterrence from a ritual perspective promises an 
affectively embedded take on the consolidation of the allied community and intra-alliance 
solidarity endowment. How NATO practices deterrence tells us much more about the Alliance 
itself than it does about the threats Russia supposedly poses in the eastern Baltic region. eFP 
rituals are productive of NATO as a historically deterrent alliance with deterrence as its 
structuring practice; of habitual NATO-Russia relations, and last not least, of a world order 
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where NATO positions itself as a core deterrer of various threats and menaces, including the 
traditional state-driven kind. The solidarity enhancement and communitas-production 
concurrently reinforce a social order where NATO views itself as a defender of the transatlantic 
security community from its original rival’s supposedly renewed appetite for territorial gains 
and political incursions into the affairs of its immediate and more distant neighbours. Yet, eFP 
as an intra-alliance solidarity performance mechanism and interaction ritual chain should not 
be interpreted as a solely pragmatic strategic move: such efforts are meaningful because they 
shape collective expectations about the types of behaviour deemed acceptable within the 
NATO-guarded international society. As a ritualized performance of deterrence, NATO’s eFP 
reproduces an international security reality of a particular kind, giving their audiences cues 
about how to think of this reality, and NATO’s place within it. Just as ‘strategic violence is less 
a function of a state than an instance of its own assertion’ (Klein, 1994: 7), the mimetic violence 
of deterrence models and reproduces a certain vision of the world, reassuring a particular 
NATO identity in the post-Crimea strategic environment. Re-introducing the ritual game of 
NATO-Russia mutual deterrence in eastern Europe, eFP reinvokes the historical NATO-Russia 
interaction habitus, thereby helping to maintain the boundaries of the Alliance, along with 
mediating ambiguity and authority in the enlarged NATO community.  
 
I have suggested to rethink deterrence as an interaction ritual chain in allied defence, solidarity 
and community-building practices. This conceptual elaboration by Collins (2004) on 
Durkheim’s and Goffman’s earlier takes on ritual action is a rich, yet an untapped conceptual 
resource for the study of world politics more generally. The literatures on security 
communities, global governance, and foreign policy analysis could find interactive ritual 
theory an inspiring template for advancing their respective debates (e.g., Holmes and Wheeler, 
2020). Future research could explore the interaction ritual chains in various security 
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communities, between assorted global actors and spheres of foreign policy making, ranging 
from diplomacy to trade and international law.  
 
The proposed ritual framework for the study of deterrence further introduces a novel avenue in 
ontological security research in IR. While the burgeoning ontological security scholarship in 
world politics has paid attention to routines (Mitzen, 2006), habits (Hopf, 2010) and 
autobiographical narratives (Steele, 2008), rituals as specific routinized performative practices 
have slipped the analytical gaze of ontological security studies thus far. Yet, ritual has crucial 
cognitively and emotionally ordering effects, helping its participants to orient in social and 
cosmological space (Lukes, 1975). From an ontological security perspective, further empirical 
studies could explore how rigid or reflective/flexible is NATO’s attachment to the practices of 
deterrence, along with providing a minutely detailed account of within-the-Alliance shift back 
to deterrence at the critical juncture of the Ukraine crisis in 2013/2014; the unfolding of NATO-
Russia interactive chain of deterrence and counter-deterrence rituals, and the embeddedness of 
the contemporary deterrence rites in the ritual patterns of the Cold War.  
 
For ritual studies, the ritualization of conventional deterrence offers an unbroached field for 
extricating the symbolic political logic, effects and functions of resorting to this central 
international security practice time and again.  
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